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Thomas v. New York: Sisiphyeani Tragedy
on the Environmental Stage
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the international pollution provision of the Clean Air Act
2
was amended by Congress in 1977, many commentators3 have hoped
that the damage caused to Canada by pollutants emitted from sources
in the United States and falling to the earth in the form of acid rain
4
could be abated with this potentially powerful new remedy. Indeed,
when the plaintiffs in New York v. Thomas 5 won their case at the
district court level, the community of environmental interests was
poised for a major victory. It appeared that where the private confer-
ences of diplomacy had stalled, the public forum of the judiciary was
1. From Greek mythology, a king of Corinth condemned forever to roll a stone up a hill
in Hades only to have it roll down again on nearing the top.
2. Clean Air Act, § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1983).
3. Eg., Lutz, Managing a Boundless Resource: U.S. Approaches to Transboundary Air
Quality Control, 11 ENVTL. L. 321 (1981); Comment, Acid Rain, Canada, and the United
States: Enforcing the International Pollution Provision of the Clean Air Act, B.U. INT'L L.J. 151
(1982); Comment, Beyond the Bargaining Table: Canada's Use of Section 115 of the United
States Clean Air Act to Prevent Acid Rain, CORNELL INT'L L.J. 193 (1983); see also, Wooley,
Acid Rain: Canadian Litigation Options in US. Court and Agency Proceedings, 17 U. TOL. L.
REV. 139 (1985) (David R. Wooley, Assistant Attorney General for the State of New York,
served as lead counsel for plaintiffs in New York v. Thomas. This article stresses the impor-
tance of Canadian involvement in acid rain litigation under the international pollution provi-
sion of the Clean Air Act.)
4. "Once released, sulfur and nitrogen pollutant gases become part of the soup of pollu-
tion, dust, and water vapor that mix in the atmosphere, cook in the sunlight, and react with
one another in a variety of ways. Here sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide gases are transformed
into sulfate and nitrate particles and eventually, if water vapor is present, into acids." G.
WETSTONE & A. ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL
REsPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 23-24 (1983). The process by which the rain
fall cleanses the atmosphere below the rainclouds is known as "scavenging" and results in the
"acid precipitation" better known as acid rain. Id. at 13. Studies on the acidity of rain, how-
ever, reflect only part of the acid problem. "Acids may also arrive in dry form as sulfate and
nitrate particles, or as sulfur dioxide gas. Upon contact with water, sulfur forms sulfuric acid,
nitrate forms nitric acid, and dry gaseous sulfur dioxide can, through a more complex process,
be converted into sulfates." Id. This is known as "dry deposition." For purposes of this Note,
the common term acid rain will connote both acid precipitation and dry depostion.
5. New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (unanimous decision) petition for reh'g filed, Nos. 85-5970 and consolidated cases
(D.C. Cir. 1986), petition for reh'g denied Nov. 24, 1986, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987),
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (June 8, 1987) (No.
86-1374), cert. denied, New York v. Thomas 107 S. Ct. 3196 (June 8, 1987) (No. 86-1373).
469
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
about to succeed. A promising solution was in sight for a menacing
environmental problem which could transform a blue-green lake
teeming with life into a crystal-clear lifeless tomb.
6
But the scene changed drastically on September 18, 1986, when
the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit,
unanimously reversed the decision of the district court with instruc-
tions to dismiss the case.7 The court, in an opinion written by then
court of appeals judge Antonin Scalia, declined to reach the substan-
tive issues of the case and instead based the holding on a procedural
point. Specifically, the court held that pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act,8 notice-and-comment procedures should have accom-
panied the findings which, according to the plaintiffs, trigger the inter-
national pollution provision of the Clean Air Act. The practical
implications of the decision are unfavorable for those anxious to see
whether the international pollution provision (section 115) of the
Clean Air Act will ever play an active role in the elimination of acid
rain in Canada. The construction given to section 115 of the Clean
Air Act by the court of appeals' opinion does not augur well for the
plaintiffs or for the environmental community.
This Note will examine the two different approaches taken by the
district court and the court of appeals. It will then focus on the pro-
cedural correctness of the notice-and-comment procedure mandated
by the court of appeals decision, and discuss the role of the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the in-
ternational pollution provision of the Clean Air Act. The Note will
conclude with a suggestion as to the motive behind the court of ap-
peals decision and a summary of some of the latest congressional at-
tempts at solving the acid rain problem.
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it is intended to pro-
vide a critical analysis of the court of appeal's decision. Second, this
Note will highlight the issues which will have to be addressed in a
revision or update of the Clean Air Act. Failure to act now to salvage
6. Howard and Perley, Acid Rain, 2 AMIcus J. 23 (1981).
Nellie Lake is a peaceful, sparkling lake in northcentral Ontario .... It's the kind of
lake chosen by the Canadian government for tourists ads in U.S. magazines ....
Nellie Lake is also acid dead. The water is sparkling clear because the acid rain has
destroyed everything in it, including the color. It is abnormally peaceful because its
natural aquatic life, from fish to crayfish to snails has ceased.
Id.
7. Thomas, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), 553(b)(A) (1977).
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section 115 of the Clean Air Act 9 could mean relegating it to its previ-
ous dormant state, while leaving the problem of long range trans-
boundary air pollution'0 to the uncertainty and inaccessibility of the
political process.
II. FACTS OF THOMAS V. NEW YORK
A. Statutory Background
Laws to abate international air pollution date back to the early
versions of the Clean Air Act.1 The House Report of the 1965 Act
states:
As a member of the North American community, the United
States cannot in good conscience decline to protect its neighbors
from pollution which is beyond their legal control. Therefore the
bill provides remedies for foreign countries adversely affected by
air pollution emanating from the United States .... 12
Prior to 1970, however, the principal legal means for abatement
of air pollution, whether domestic or international, was the enforce-
ment of conference procedures, "a lengthy and uncertain process in
which all parties-State, local, Federal agencies and the polluter-
were convened to negotiate a schedule for control of the emissions
alleged to cause the problem."'
3
With the adoption in 1970 of national ambient air quality stan-
dards (NAAQS)' 4 and statutory deadlines,' 5 the enforcement mecha-
9. Clean Air Act § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1983).
10. Long range transboundary air pollution is the technical definition used to describe the
acid rain phenomenon in the international as opposed to the domestic setting:
The emissions which form acid rain respect no national or state boundaries; they are
part of a "transfrontier" pollution problem to which the world is becoming more
sensitive. There seems to be little doubt in the Province of Ontario that Ohio River
Valley power plants will be the ruination of Ontario's large tourist industry. U.S.
states bordering Canada also suffer from the effects of acid rain sent from a foreign
source.
1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.09, at 2-588 (1987).
11. Brief for Appellees at 11, New York v. Thomas, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (No.
85-5970).
12. H.R. REP. No. 899, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3613.
13. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57.
14. "Ambient" or "air quality" standards prescribe pollutant levels in the atmos-
phere that cannot legally be exceeded during a specified time period. That is, they
state a level of concentration of a particular pollutant in the air which should not be
exceeded on the average during a given period. They do not apply directly to indi-
vidual pollution sources; these are controlled by emissions standards designed to re-
duce total emissions from all sources in an area to that point which results in
achievement of the ambient or air quality standard.
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nism changed from the conference procedure to the state
implementation plan (SIP) 16 with its enforceable requirements for
every source of pollution.1 7 The conference procedure, however, re-
mained the sole enforcement mechanism for international abatement
under section 115 of the Clean Air Act. Hence, the pre-1977 version
of the international pollution provision of the Clean Air Act called for
the abatement of air pollution by means of conference procedures if
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency found
that emissions originating in the United States endangered the health
or welfare of persons in a foreign country.' 8
Upon amending major portions of the Clean Air Act in 1977,
Congress decided that the success of the SIP with respect to interstate
air quality control might provide a corresponding advancement in the
international area, especially since the old provision had not been
used.' 9 As a result, in 1977 subsection (a) of the international provi-
sion of the Clean Air Act was amended to read:
Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys, or
studies from any duly constituted international agency has reason
to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United
States cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign coun-
try or whenever the Secretary of State requests him to do so with
respect to such pollution which the Secretary of State alleges is of
such a nature, the Administrator shall give formal notification
thereof to the Governor of the State in which such emissions
originate.
20
Furthermore, subsection (b) provides that the notice of the Adminis-
Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards. Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323, 323 n.2 (1974). See, Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control,
FED. ENVTL. L. 1058 (1974).
15. Each state was required to be in compliance with NAAQS by December 31, 1982.
Compliance may be delayed until December 31, 1987, for carbon monoxides and photochemi-
cal oxidants. Clean Air Act § 172, 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1983).
16. The responsibility for meeting these air quality standards (NAAQS) is delegated to
the states, "each of which is required to submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP) for EPA
approval. The SIPs must provide for the 'implementation, maintenance, and enforcement' of
these ... standards in each air quality control region within each state." Lutz, Managing a
Boundless Resource: U.S. Approaches to Transboundary Air Quality Control, 11 ENVTL. L. 321,
326 (1981).
17. S. REP. No. 127, supra note 13.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Clean Air Act § 115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1983).
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trator shall be deemed a finding under section 1 10(a)(2)(H)(ii) of the
Clean Air Act, requiring a state implementation plan revision "with
respect to so much of the applicable implementation plan as is inade-
quate to prevent or eliminate the endangerment referred to in subsec-
tion (a) of this section."
'2'
Finally, subsection (c) of section 115, introduced the requirement
of reciprocity. 22 The section would apply "only to a foreign country
which the Administrator determines has given the United States es-
sentially the same rights with respect to the prevention or control of
air pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by this
section." 23
Although diplomacy achieved some minor success in addressing
the issue of acid rain through agreements, accords, and memoranda,
these efforts have resulted mostly in establishing joint commissions to
study the problem and share information. 24 Little concrete progress
has actually occurred to solve the problem. Doubts about the ability
of the Clean Air Act to protect acid-sensitive ecosystems in both the
United States and Canada led some legislators to propose new acid
rain legislation. 25 Unfortunately, none of the proposed bills have been
enacted into law "because none of them has been able to overcome the
formidable barriers presented by conflicting economic and political
interests."
26
21. Clean Air Act § 115(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b) (1983).
22. Clean Air Act § 115(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) (1983).
23. Id.
24. E.g., Memorandum of Intent between the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of the United States of America Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution (Aug. 5,
1980).
25. Comment, Acid Rain, Canada, and the United States: Enforcing the International
Pollution Provision of the Clean Air Act, 1982 B.U. INT'L L.J. 151, 172 (This article provides a
good summary of the early versions of proposed acid rain legislation).
26. Joint Report of the Special Envoys on Acid Rain (Jan. 1986) at 16 [hereinafter Lewis-
Davis Report]. The "Shamrock Summit" on March 17 and 18, 1985 between Prime Minister
of Canada Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan culminated in an agreement in
which each would appoint a special envoy to examine the acid rain issue and report back
before their next meeting in Spring 1986. Drew Lewis, former Secretary of Transportation,
worked with William Davis, former Premier of Ontario, in preparing this report. Id.
Wind patterns contribute to the political complexity of the acid rain problem. They often
exacerbate what would be a difficult problem even if the polluter and the victims were in the
same locale. For example, coal-fired power plants in the Ohio Valley emit pollutants which
are carried by the winds directly into southern Canada and the northeastern United States
before the acids return to the ground and the effects are noticed. At that point, the stage is set
for a battle which pits Canada against the United States, the northeastern United States
against the Midwest, and fishing, recreational and environmental interests against utility, min-
ing, and union interests.
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The failure of the legislative alternative and the inadequacy of
the diplomatic alternative pushed the newly revised international pol-
lution provision to the forefront as a potential means to abate long
range international air pollution.
B. Procedural History and Facts of Thomas v. New York
In April 1980, in a speech to state environmental officials, then
EPA Administrator under the Carter Administration, Douglas
Costle, addressed the critical problem of acid rain. He concluded that
" 'the time [had] come [to] make the transition from research to ac-
tion,' and that the EPA intended to work within the structure of the
Clean Air Act to address the problem.
'27
In October of 1980, the International Joint Commission (IJC)
issued its Seventh Annual Report on Great Lakes Water Quality.28 In
this report the Commission found that "acid rain [was] causing harm
to water quality, soil fertility, crops, forests, property and human
health in the Great Lakes Basin, an area including parts of seven
states and the Province of Ontario.
'29
On December 17, 1980, the Canadian Parliament enacted a law
similar to section 115 of the Clean Air Act. The Canadian law30 pro-
vides protection to the United States from Canadian air pollution
sources.
31
On the basis of the Canadian statute and the IJC report, Admin-
istrator Costle determined that the prerequisites for pollution abate-
ment action under section 115 had been satisfied.32 In letters dated
January 13, 1981 Costle submitted his findings to Secretary of State
27. Brief for Appellees, supra note 11, at 12.
28. Seventh Annual Report on Great Lakes Water Quality (1980).
This report gives an overview and a lake-by-lake description of the water quality in
the Great Lakes Basin during 1978 with an indication of some broad changes that
have occurred since 1972 .... A range of problems arising from industrial and
municipal discharges to the Lakes are addressed, including toxic and hazardous sub-
stances and hazardous waste disposal; phosphorous and eutrophication; the long
range transport of airborne pollutants, and radioactivity.
Id. at 1.
29. Brief for Appellees, supra note 11, at 13. See Seventh Ann. Report on Great Lakes
Water Quality, supra note 28, at 48-55.
30. An Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, ch. 45, § 3, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 1160.
31. Section 3 of the Canada's Act to Amend the Clean Air Act was a vital step towards
the enforcement of section 115 in the United States. Quickly passed by the Canadian Parlia-
ment, the amendment was intended to, and in fact did, form the basis for a judicial determina-
tion that the reciprocity requirement of section 115(c) had been satisfied.
32. Brief for Appellees, supra note 11, at 13.
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Edmund Muskie33 and Senator George Mitchell. 34 He publicly an-
nounced his findings in a press release35 three days later. Costle's let-
ter to Secretary Muskie stated that "acid deposition is endangering
public welfare in the United States and Canada and... United States
and Canadian sources contribute to the problem not only in the coun-
try where they are located but also in the neighboring country. ' 36 He
also stated that his conclusions were based on the Seventh Annual
Report on Great Lakes Water Quality issued by the IJC.3 7
Administrator Costle also concluded in his letter that Canadian
legislation passed on December 17, 198038 gave the United States es-
sentially the same rights39 under Canadian law as Canada enjoyed
under United States law. Costle's second letter, addressed to Senator
Mitchell, 40 expanded upon his findings sent to Secretary Muskie. In
spite of these determinations, however, Costle's successors in the EPA
repeatedly refused to take action to issue section 115 notices. 4'
Consequently, in 1985 six northeastern states,4 2 four environ-
mental associations, 43 former New York Congressman Richard Ottin-
ger, and three United States citizens owning property in the Muskoka
Lakes region of Canada filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia." They sought to compel then Adminis-
trator of the EPA, Lee M. Thomas, "to require emitting states to re-
33. Letter from EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle to Secretary of State Edmund S.
Muskie (Jan. 13, 1981), reprinted in New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, app. A (D.D.C.
1985), rev'd 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
34. Letter from EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle to Senator George Mitchell (Jan.
13, 1981) reprinted in New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at app. B.
35. EPA Administrator Believes Canadian Acid Rain Problem May Warrant Action in
US., EPA Press Release (Jan. 16, 1981) (on file at Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.).
36. Letter from EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle to Secretary of State Edmund S.
Muskie (Jan. 13, 1981), reprinted in New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, app. A (D.D.C.
1985), rev'd 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
37. Id.
38. Id. See also Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, ch. 45, § 3, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 1160.
39. The existence of reciprocal rights is essential to the enforcement of section 115. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
40. Letter from EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle to Senator George Mitchell (Jan.
13, 1981) reprinted in New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at app. B.
41. Brief for Appellees, supra note 11, at 14.
42. This number eventually grew to eight northeastern states by the time the case reached
the court of appeals: New York, Maine, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and New Jersey. The province of Ontario also joined the case on appeal.
43. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the
National Audobon Society, and the National Wildlife Federation.
44. New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1476 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd 802 F.2d 1443
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
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vise their State Implementation Plans, as mandated under section 115
of the Clean Air Act ... in order to abate the damage allegedly trace-
able to the transboundary air pollution. ' 45 The plaintiffs claimed that
the findings made by Costle while he was EPA Administrator were
sufficient to invoke section 115 .46 Intervening on behalf of the agency
were three midwestern states (West Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio),
the National Coal Company, and a group of utilities. All of these
parties were concerned that they might be adversely affected by any
determination EPA might be required to make about emissions con-
tributing to acid rain.
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. District Court Decision
1. Jurisdiction
The district court granted jurisdiction based on the "citizen suit
provision" 47 of the Clean Air Act. That provision allows any person
to commence a civil action on his own behalf "against the Adminis-
trator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator .... -48 The plaintiffs' allegation that the duty of the
EPA Administrator to issue revision notices was mandatory, and the
sufficiency of the notice, persuaded the court to exercise jurisdiction. 49
The court then addressed the issue of standing. It stated that "a
plaintiff seeking redress must allege: 1) threatened or actual injury
resulting from the putatively illegal action; and 2) an injury that can
be fairly traced to the challenged action that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision."' 50 The court concluded that all of the plain-
tiffs except Representative Ottinger 51 presented facts sufficient to meet
the constitutional requirements.
On the requirement of direct injury, the court pointed out that
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1983).
48. Id.
49. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at 1477.
50. Id. at 1478.
51. Id. at 1479. (The court found that since there were no special standing rules for
members of Congress, and since Ottinger did not allege any property or personal interest in the
matter, his complaint was merely a "generalized grievance" shared with others. He was, how-
ever, allowed to remain in the action since other plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to invoke the
court's jurisdiction). Id. at 1480.
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although the plaintiffs may not have presented specific evidence of
identifiable harm, "legally recognizable harm may be retrospective or
prospective in nature."' 52 It was sufficient that the plaintiffs alleged
that pollution from the midwestern United States may cause damage
to air quality, water quality, and property in Canada, "areas in which
plaintiffs' citizens or members live, work, vacation or own prop-
erty." 5
3
The more difficult question involved the second requirement,
traceability and redressability. 54 Recognizing the inherently problem-
atic nature of connecting injury to relief in the area of acid rain, the
court relied on the statute itself. The court explained that "at the
heart of section 115 is the congressional determination that the revi-
sion of state implementation plans is an effective mechanism for
abatement of international air pollution." 55 Furthermore, the court
cited prevailing precedent which held that the redressability require-
ment should be construed broadly in favor of the plaintiffs, and that
the plaintiffs need only show that the requested relief would benefit
them in some perceptible, tangible fashion. 56 Having settled the jus-
ticiability issues, the court next turned to the merits of the case.
2. Merits of the Case
The court analyzed the plaintiffs' claim under section 115. It be-
gan with the requirement that the Administrator's decision be based
upon reports from a "duly constituted international agency."' 57 The
court recognized that the IJC "is charged with the responsibility of
resolving transboundary water and navigational disputes between the
United States and Canada" under the United States-Canada Bound-
ary Waters Treaty of 1909. 58 Its duties include the approval of appli-
cations for activities that would affect the natural flow of water on the
other side of the boundary. Thus, the court concluded "that the
52. Id. at 1480.
53. Id.
54. The plaintiffs argued that these two elements "are inseparable in the present case
because the relief plaintiffs seek is an order compelling the EPA to end the very inaction which
is the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries." The defendants, however, claimed that the plaintiffs
failed to establish a causal link between EPA inaction and the aggravated harm in Canada. Id.
at 1481.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Clean Air Act § 115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1983).
58. New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1482 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd 802 F.2d 1443
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
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Costle determination 59 was made upon receipt of reports... from a
duly constituted international agency." 6
Next the court examined the second clause of section 115(a),
which requires that the Administrator have "reason to believe that
any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country .... -61 A
passage from the IJC report cited by the court stated that the trans-
mission of toxic and hazardous substances is a serious problem and
that "[a]ll parts of the Great Lakes watershed are now receiving pre-
cipitation containing five to forty times more acid than would occur in
the absence of atmospheric emissions. ' 62 The court found that the
IJC report did afford former Administrator Costle ample basis to con-
clude that air pollution from the United States contributed to acid
deposition in Canada and could reasonably endanger the public
health and welfare of that country.63
Having found that the Costle letters were sufficient to satisfy sub-
section (a), the court turned to subsection (c). Section 115(c) requires
that Canada afford to the United States essentially the same rights
that the United States grants to Canada with respect to international
air pollution. 64 This "reciprocity requirement" was discussed by Ad-
ministrator Costle in his letters to Secretary Muskie and Senator
Mitchell. 65 The Administrator had determined that reciprocity did
exist based on Section 21.1 of the Canadian Clean Air Act. 66 Never-
theless, he had qualifed this assertion by stating that it was "a fluid
and dynamic situation that is subject to change. ' '67
Although the district court was satisfied that reciprocal rights
did exist, it was troubled "by Costle's own qualifications of his conclu-
sion, aggravated in this case by the lengthy passage of time since the
59. See text accompanying notes 32-40.
60. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at 1482.
61. Clean Air Act § 115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1983).
62. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at 1482. See Seventh Ann. Report on Great Lakes Water
Quality, at 50.
63. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at 1482.
64. Clean Air Act § 115(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) (1983).
65. See text accompanying notes 33-34.
66. An Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, ch. 45, § 3, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 1160.
67. Letter from EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle to Senator George Mitchell (Jan.
13, 1981) reprinted in New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. at app. B.
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determination was made."' 68 Therefore, the court gave the EPA an
opportunity to review the issue of reciprocity to determine whether
the Costle conclusion was still viable.
Once the formal requirements of section 115 are met, "the Ad-
ministrator shall give formal notification thereof to the Governor of
the State in which such emissions originate" so those states may revise
their state implementation plans.69 The court explained in a footnote
that:
the states to which notification is due were not identified by Costle.
Costle instructed his staff to determine which states were to be
targeted, but no final action was taken. The Court is convinced
that the obligation to identify the polluting states is incidental to
giving formal notification and not a prerequisite to the conclusion
that Costle made the requisite findings under section 115.
7
0
The defendants' main contention was that Costle's findings did
not constitute official decision-making and, therefore, could have no
legal significance. They specifically objected to the fact that Costle
used letters to make his determinations. The defendants argued that
letters cannot constitute formal administrative decision-making. Pub-
lication in the Federal Register, by contrast, would have given these
determinations the characteristics of official action.
71
The plaintiffs countered that "the letters have all the attributes of
official agency action. ' 72 The plaintiffs cited to numerous instances
where official EPA action was thus effectuated.
73
The district court observed, "the fact that Costle memorialized
his findings in a letter does not defeat their classification as official
agency action."' 74 It reasoned that: 1) "publication in the Federal
Register would be inappropriate for this kind of action because it is
not a rule or policy statement" under the Administrative Procedure
Act;75 2) "notification to the governors would presumably be achieved
by letter;"'7 6 and, 3) the Administrator's choice of medium should not
68. New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1484 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd 802 F.2d 1443
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
69. Id.
70. Id. at n.e.
71. Id. at 1484.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1), 553(b) (1977).
76. New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1484 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd 802 F.2d 1443
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
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frustrate his intent to secure compliance by the states.77
After addressing the defendants' remaining two arguments, 78 the
court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and or-
dered the Administrator to notify the appropriate states for imple-
mentation plan revisions. The defendants then appealed.
B. Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
framed the issue in the case as "whether, under § 115 of the Clean Air
Act . . . , Administrator Costle's letter legally obligated his successors
to identify the states in which pollution responsible for acid deposition
originates and to order those states to abate the emissions. '79 The
court began by reviewing the applicable sections of the Clean Air Act
and discussing the Costle letters. The court stressed that although the
findings were sent to Secretary Muskie and Senator Mitchell and were
announced in a press release, "[n]o advance notice of Administrator
Costle's actions was given, no comments were solicited, and neither
the letters nor the findings were published in the Federal Register.
8 0
The court of appeals strongly criticized the district court opinion.
Judge Scalia stated that the district court "was not troubled by the
EPA's argument that identifying which states to notify would be time
consuming, costly and perhaps impossible . . . Likewise, the court
was untroubled that Administrator Costle made his findings in private
correspondence .... a81
The court then considered the Administrative Procedure Act
77. Id.
78. Defendants' second argument was that Costle's actions were revoked by the actions
of his successor, Administrator Ann Gorsuch. In a letter she sent to the governor of Ohio on
Sept. 22, 1981, Administrator Gorsuch stated that the Costle letters did not satisfy section 115
and that the letters were of no legal significance. The court found that the ordinary procedure
employed by Administrators to avoid being bound by the decisions of a predescessor required
more than Gorsuch wrote in her letter. Since Gorsuch neither reviewed the factual bases for
Costle's determination nor suggested his determination was erroneous, her letter did not rise to
the stature of a revocation. Id. at 1485.
Defendants' third argument was that even if Costle did make the requisite findings, the
decision to notify the states or take other additional steps is discretionary. The court found the
language of section 115() dispositive, observing that the normal inference of "shall" is that
the act is mandatory. Moreover, legislative history of section 115 provided that a finding of
"harm" by the Administrator would require the State to revise its implementation plan. Id.
79. Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3196 (1987).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1446. In its analysis of section 115, the court observed that it is "an unusual
statute executed in an unexpected manner." It reasoned that in "a complex, multi-source
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(APA). 2 The APA governs the procedures by which government
agencies promulgate rules in the absence of procedures set forth in the
agency's enabling statute. If applicable, it requires that general notice
of the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register and that the
agency give interested persons an opportunity to comment on the pro-
posed rule.8 3 Examining the definition of a "rule," the court deter-
mined that pursuant to section 551(4) of the APA, "an agency
statement that bound subsequent EPA Administrators to issue SIP
revision notices would be a statement of 'future effect designed to im-
plement ... law or policy' "s84 and would thus be a rule. Therefore,
the Costle findings constituted a rule. Because no notice-and-com-
ment procedures accompanied the Costle findings, Scalia concluded
pollution problem like acid deposition, identification of the problem does not necessarily bring
with it identification of the blameworthy states." Id.
82. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1977).
83. According to one scholar:
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides for a system of antecedent
publicity before agencies may engage in substantive rule-making. General notice of
any proposed rule-making must be published in the Federal Register. The agency
must then afford interested persons the opportunity to participate in the rule-making
process through submission of written data, views, or arguments, with or without
opportunity to present them orally, and all relevant matter so presented is to be
considered by the agency.
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 61, at 165 (1976) (footnote omitted).
84. Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3196 (1987). This provision defines a rule as "the whole or part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure or practice requirements of an
agency .... 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1977). The APA classifies administrative action into two
categories. "Its procedural provisions are grounded on the distinction between the legislative
or rulemaking functions of administrative agencies, on the one hand, and their judicial or
adjudicative activities, on the other." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, § 55, at 143. Although
there is no bright line between rulemaking and adjudication, a key factor in making this deter-
mination is time. "A rule prescribes future patterns of conduct; a decision determines liabilites
upon the basis of present or past facts." Id. § 55, at 144.
On this point, the court of appeals concluded "that if Administrator Costle's findings left
the EPA no alternative but to issue SIP notices ultimately causing the termination or restric-
tion of the operations of many utilities and manufacturers-if they forced the EPA to take
direct and substantial regulatory actions-they could not be promulgated without notice-and-
comment procedures." Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1447. Although this author believes that even if
the Costle findings are a rule, the Clean Air Act provides for notice-and-comment at a later
point in time, the findings in fact defy easy classification. They are neither rulemaking nor
adjudication. The APA classifications, formed before the administrative law boom of the
1960's and 1970's, are simply inappropriate. Perhaps the best way to define the findings is as
agency action that has "fall[en] through the cracks of the APA." Historic Green Springs, Inc.
v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 851 (E.D. Va. 1980) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
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that they were of no legal effect.8 5
The court also determined that the Costle findings did not fall
within any of the exceptions8 6 to the general requirement of notice-
and-comment before rulemaking, such as "interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice."87 The case was therefore dismissed.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Identification of Polluting States
The interpretation of section 115 by the district court differed
greatly from that of the court of appeals. Once the district court
found it had jurisdiction, it proceeded directly to the statute. The
district court's analysis manifests a sensitivity to the precise language
of section 115 and the sequential order of "finding" and "duty" which
the statute appears to contemplate.88
Because the principal issue in the case boiled down to whether
the Administrator had a duty to ask the polluting states to revise their
implementation plans, the district court was careful to separate out
those findings which were prerequisites to the duty and those which
would follow in its wake. This explains why the court noted that the
obligation to identify the polluting states was incidental to the Ad-
ministrator's giving formal notification to the governors.8 9 Although
using the term "incidental" 9 was an unfortunate word choice, the
ordering of finding and duty not only followed the literal mandate of
the statute but also made a good deal of intuitive sense as well.
For example, even though there is a dearth of information from
Congress as to exactly how section 115 was intended to operate, what
little does exist seems to suggest that the proper focus of the section is
to recognize an obligation on the part of the United States to abate
85. Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1448.
86. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1977).
87. Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1447.
88. Brief for Appellees, supra note 11, at 54. ("When Congress wished to mandate se-
quential action by the Administrator, it knew how to do so," citing to §§ 108(a) and 109(a)
requiring the Administrator to first publish a list of pollutants, then issue standards for the
listed pollutants and also §§ 111 (b), 111 (f) requiring Administrator to first publish a list of
categories of stationary sources, then issue performance standards for the listed categories).
Id. at n.30.
89. New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1484 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd 802 F.2d
1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
90. Id.
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long-range transboundary air pollution.9' Assuming this is the crux
of the legislation, it stands for the very important proposition that
once the Administrator validly determines that air pollution emitted
from sources within the United States is causing harm to a foreign
country, the focus becomes domestic. The burden then shifts to the
United States to decide which of its states should revise their SIP's
and to what degree. It would seem unfair to allow the EPA to escape
the parameters of the statute, and thereby shift the burden back onto
the foreign country, simply by failing to identify the blameworthy
states. Such an interpretation adds a virtually impenetrable gloss over
the statute because of the difficulty in determining which states to
identify. Therefore, if the district court were to place identification
before a duty to notify, the difficulty of the task would hopelessly im-
pede the statute's operation. By imposing a legal duty on the agency,
the ruling of the district court at least forced the agency to begin the
long process of enforcement.
In contrast, the court of appeals decision obfuscates the identifi-
cation issue. Without squarely addressing the problem, Scalia criti-
cizes the district court for rejecting the EPA argument that
identification of the blameworthy states would be time-consuming,
costly, and perhaps impossible. 92 While this is partially true (it is
doubtful that substantial identification is impossible), it is difficult to
see its legal relevance to the question of whether the duty to notify the
blameworthy states is precedent or subsequent to the identification of
those states. Even more difficult to understand is the relevance of
these comments to the one dispositive issue in this case, i.e., whether
notice-and-comment should have accompanied the Costle findings.
B. Notice-and-Comment Procedures
There are two important problems with the court of appeals'
conclusion that the Costle findings constitute a rule and are therefore
subject to the APA notice-and-comment procedures. First, a strict
reading of section 115 of the Clean Air Act suggests that Congress
had already provided for notice-and-comment at a later point where
Congress believed it was more appropriate, and therefore, resort to
the APA was inappropriate. Second, the court cites National Asphalt
91. See supra text accompanying note 12; see also S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
57.
92. Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1446.
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Pavement Association v. Train 93 to support its conclusion, while this
case, in fact, better lends itself to the plaintiffs' position.
The thrust of this discussion centers around an important con-
cept. Section 115 apparently contemplates a sequential order of
events: a step-by-step process 94 which begins first with a reciprocity
finding, followed by a report from a duly constituted international
agency, then a determination of injury based upon the Administra-
tor's "reasonable belief," and so on. One could probably recognize
each step as a rule (since all the steps in the aggregate will have some
future effect) and thereby require notice-and-comment to accompany
each finding or determination. This approach clearly would be hope-
lessly inefficient and obstructive. Considering what notice-and-com-
ment is intended to accomplish, the proper inquiry should focus upon
the appropriate time to demand this procedural device as an absolute
requirement without which no duty to act exists on the part of the
EPA.
1. Statutory Construction
Contrary to what the plaintiffs9s-and to a degree what the de-
fendants-argued, there is ample statutory direction to help resolve
this inquiry. A textual analysis indicates that the proper time for no-
tice-and-comment is upon notice to the governors of the polluting
states. Section 115 provides that once the Administrator determines
that pollution emitted in the United States endangers the public
health and welfare in a foreign country, "the Administrator shall give
formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in which such
emissions originate. . . .The notice of the Administrator shall be
deemed a finding under section 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) of this title which
requires a plan revision .... "96
The deliberateness of Congressional drafting is borne out by the
fact that further action of the EPA at this point is prescribed in sec-
93. National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95. Plaintiffs' notice-and-comment argument de-emphasized the express language of the
statute, probably because there was no hint that that would become the sine qua non of the
case. In their brief they argued that a requirement of notice-and-comment on the findings
would create an "additional step" not required by section 115. Brief for Appellees, supra note
11, at 54. It was only on petition for rehearing that plaintiffs urged the court to recognize that
under the statute notice-and-comment would have been afforded at a later stage. Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, New York v. Thomas, 802 F.2d 1443
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (No. 85-5970), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987) (emphasis added).
96. Clean Air Act § 115(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b) (1983) (emphasis added).
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tion 1 10(a)(2)(H)(ii). 97 This section provides that after the issuance of
revision notices, and the subsequent submission to the EPA of new
SIP's, the Administrator must approve the plan if he finds both that it
was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and provides for revi-
sion after public hearing.98 Thus, there is some explicit suggestion as
to where Congress believed notice-and-comment to be important, dur-
ing or after the notification stage, not before.
Further textual support can be found in section 115(a) itself.
There are two events which would trigger a duty on the part of the
Administrator to issue revision notices. First, the Administrator
could act on his own authority if, based upon surveys and reports, he
has reason to anticipate that pollution emitted in the United States is
endangering health or public welfare in a foreign country.99 Second,
the Administrator could act in response to a request from the Secre-
tary of State when the Secretary alleges the same set of facts.l°° This
second triggering device reflects the strong international interest to be
served and it recognizes the unilateral nature of the "harm finding"
from either of these officials.
On the latter point, one might ask the following question: had the
Secretary of State directed the Administrator to prepare revision no-
tices, would the court subject the Secretary of State's findings to the
requirement of notice-and-comment? Because of the Secretary's in-
ternational duties, it is doubtful that the court would require notice-
and-comment on an order issued by his office. If this assumption is
correct, under the court of appeal's reasoning a determination of
harm from the Administrator is subject to notice-and-comment, but
one issued by the Secretary of State might not be. It would be incon-
sistent, however, to impose on one executive department a require-
ment of notice-and-comment which is not required of another when
the determination in either case is exactly the same. Since statutes
should be interpreted to avoid inconsistencies, notice-and-comment
should not be required at the "finding" stage.
2. The Case of National Asphalt
One point which might have bothered the court about section
115 is that on its face it contemplates only one situation where notice-
97. Clean Air Act § 1 10(a)(2)(H)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) (1983).
98. Id.
99. Clean Air Act § 115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1983).
100. Id.
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and-comment must be held, that is after notification to the governors
of the emitting states. At that point, a state being ordered to revise its
SIP could presumably present factual data to the EPA and argue that
instead of emitting "x amount of a particular pollutant, it really only
emits "y," a lesser amount, and therefore the EPA standards are too
stringent. The court may have feared that once revision notices had
been delivered, it would be too late for a state to deny any contribu-
tion to international pollution at all. Thus, by requiring notice-and-
comment on the findings, a state would have a chance to comment on
whether or not it is a contributor and should be issued a revision
notice.
But far from supporting this position, the decision the court
cites, National Asphalt Pavement Association v. Train,10 argues
against it. Judge Scalia contends that:
Had the statute [section 115] been executed as Congress probably
anticipated, the present suit would not have arisen. Notice of the
"endangerment" and "reciprocity" findings would have been is-
sued at the same time as the proposed SIP revision notices, com-
ment would have been taken on both, and both would have been
published in final form in the Federal Register.
0 2
Scalia goes on to explain that the defendants' claim that the findings
are not legally binding has now arisen "[b]ecause Administrator
Costle chose to issue the 'endangerment' and 'reciprocity' findings
before attempting to identify the culpable states .... 11103
National Asphalt involved section 111104 of the Clean Air Act
which requires the Administrator of the EPA to maintain a list of
stationary sources which cause or contribute significantly to air pollu-
tion reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
05
Within 120 days after the Administrator designates a particular
source category as a "significant contributor," he must publish pro-
posed standards of performance for sources within this category.1
0 6
Petitioners, National Asphalt Pavement Association, argued that
by "simultaneously publishing the 'significant contributor' designa-
tion and proposed standards of performance, the Administrator indi-
101. National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
102. New York v. Thomas, 802 F.2d 1443, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3196 (1987).
103. Id.
104. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1983).
105. Clean Air Act § I II(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(l)(A) (1983).
106. Clean Air Act § 11l(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(l)(B) (1983).
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cated that he had already reached a final determination on the
'significant contributor' designation and did not consider it open for
discussion during the informal rulemaking procedure. ' 10 7 The court
disagreed. On the basis of the EPA's published notices, the agency's
response to written comments, and record correspondences between
the petitioners and EPA, the court concluded that "the 'significant
contributor' designation was subject to comment as a threshold ques-
tion in the rulemaking process, and that petitioners were specifically
informed of that fact." 10 8
The National Asphalt court stated that "where the data underly-
ing the 'significant contributor' designation is likely to overlap sub-
stantially with that underlying the proposed standards, the most
sensible course for an agency is to have one proceeding directed at
both issues."' 0 9 In other words, National Asphalt should be read as
standing for the proposition that the EPA need not hold two separate
rulemaking proceedings as to different parts of one rule. Therefore, it
does not follow from this case that because the Costle findings were
not issued in conjunction with the revision notices (with notice-and-
comment accompanying both), notice-and-comment must now ac-
company the finding alone as a condition precedent to issuing revision
notices.
Applying the principle of National Asphalt to the facts of
Thomas, the rule promulgated is the request for plan revisions from
each polluting state. Upon notification that it must revise its SIP's, a
given state then has an opportunity to claim that it is not a contribu-
tor to international air pollution. Much of the evidence which the
state presents to prove this will also be relevant as to the extent that
each state will have to curtail its emissions if it is found to be a con-
tributor. Indeed, to call for notice-and-comment at an earlier stage
would be to put the cart before the horse. These findings are interwo-
ven with the revision notices. In and of themselves they have no effect
except as an additional step towards the enforcement of the provision.
One might ask what there is to comment upon (and who should be
there to comment upon it) when no states have yet been targeted by
the EPA for revision?
107. National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
108. Id. at 780.
109. Id. at 779 n.2.
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V. THE DISCRETION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
The final sentences of the court of appeals opinion truly ring the
death knell for the plaintiffs by foreclosing any future possibility of
relief on the basis of the Costle findings. Scalia asserts that "because
the findings were issued without notice-and-comment, they cannot be
the basis for the judicial relief appellees seek. How and when the
agency chooses to proceed to the stage of notification triggered by the
findings is within the agency's discretion and not subject to judicial
compulsion."'110 There can be little doubt that Scalia's imposition of
the procedural hurdle of notice-and-comment effectively ended the
litigation.
The court's holding has two effects on the plaintiffs. First, it
means that the Costle letters have no binding legal effect. Second, and
more importantly, it suggests that it is within the EPA's absolute dis-
cretion to decide whether it should resurrect the substance of the
Costle findings, call for notice-and-comment, and proceed to the stage
of notification.'
Because Scalia's final observations resonate throughout environ-
mental law, the final sentence of the court's opinion merits closer
scrutiny. Is it true that the judiciary cannot compel the agency to
proceed to the stage of notification since that is within the discretion
of the agency? Stated another way, can the EPA be compelled to re-
issue a finding which would begin the notification process all over
again?
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act"12 posits the gen-
eral rule that mandatory duties can be compelled by order of the
court through a citizen suit but that discretionary duties cannot be so
compelled." 3 However, as Professor Rodgers points out: "Distin-
guishing obligatory official duties answerable to citizen suits from pro-
tected islands of discretionary choice presents one of the more
delightful conundrums of the law.""14
Rodgers suggests that the use of citizen suits to enforce nondis-
110. New York v. Thomas, 802 F.2d at 1443, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3196 (1987).
111. The irony of the case is difficult to overlook. The court has just told the EPA that
because it did not do its job correctly, i.e., holding notice-and-comment, the EPA prevails in
the litigation. This odd result proceeds, of course, from having two hostile EPA Administra-
tions back to back.
112. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1983).
113. Id.
114. 2 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER ch. 4, § 4.5, at 71 (1986).
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cretionary duties may be a means of uncovering "the smoking gun
illegalities of the agency [EPA]."' 1 5 He goes on to state that:
This approach would be in keeping with the role of the citizen as
the excavator of past commitments. It thus might be expected that
nondiscretionary activity for purposes of citizen suits creeps over
"to include instances where the Administrator transgresses the
bounds of his discretion and not only the extraordinary cases
where he has no discretion at all."'
16
Examples of nondiscretionary duties include the EPA obligations
to publish reports and regulations by a specific deadline, "7 to promul-
gate an implementation plan by the time required, I and to determine
whether a state-submitted plan complies with the Clean Air Act. 19
The discretionary side of the ledger "includes most of the uni-
verse of administrative actions,"'' 20 such as the Administrator's duties
to bring emergency actions, 12 to list hydrochloric acid and silicon
dioxide as hazardous air pollutants and to establish emission stan-
dards for them, 22 to determine that an action is environmentally "un-
satisfactory" for purposes of section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 123 and
to make findings that may trigger a variety of enforcement actions.124
The proposition that it is completely within the discretion of the
Administrator to make findings triggering enforcement is unsettling.
As a general rule, the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act make
115. Id. Historically, the availability of a writ of mandate turned on the distinction be-
tween ministerial and discretionary actions. Often the test was whether "the administrator
exceeded the permissible scope of his discretion." Id. at 211. In focusing on the administra-
tor's authority, this refinement conforms to the close scrutiny doctrine of judicial review. Id.
at 71.
116. 1 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER ch. 3, § 3.4, at 223
(1986).
117. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (enforcing duty to
issue final standards for radionuclide emissions); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 515 F.
Supp. 264, 270-71 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (it is sufficient to find an arguable nondiscretionary duty to
promulgate regulations in some of the settings depicted in the complaint).
118. Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 3 ELR 20043 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
119. Citizens for a Better Env't, 515 F. Supp. at 271 (it is "almost axiomatic" that EPA has
a non-discretionary duty to determine in a timely fashion whether state SIPs comply; discour-
aging conditional approvals and deferrals).
120. RODGERS, supra note 116, ch.3, § 3.4, at 224.
121. Cf Committee for Consideration of Jones Fall Sewage Sys. v. Train, 375 F. Supp.
1148 (D.C. Md. 1974), aff'd, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Clean Water Act case).
122. Thompson v. Chicago, 5 ELR 20283 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
123. Sierra Club v. Morton, 379 F. Supp. 1254 (D.C. Colo. 1974).
124. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 395 F. Supp. 313
(W.D. Wis. 1975) (discretionary duty to decide whether a violation occurs but a mandatory
duty to notify and to make a finding whether a violation has occurred).
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clear that, as to major sources, a civil action "must be filed in the
wake of a finding of violation of the Act."'125 "The crux of this slip-
pery slope of compulsion is whether EPA is obliged to make the find-
ing that starts the slide," 126 that is to say, whether the EPA is obliged
to find or not find a violation of the Clean Air Act.
The policy arguments go both ways. The EPA argues that it
does not have the resources to fully enforce all the laws within its
province; therefore, it does not issue findings in every case it could,
and perhaps, should. 127 The other side, argued forcefully in Wiscon-
sin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co.,128
questions the value of a promise of a compulsory duty to file a civil
suit against a major polluter if the agency retains discretion to declare
known violations as not "found." 129 So far at least, the agency has
been able to retain its discretion. 3 0  Professor Rodgers, however,
speculates that it could boil down to "how well the objecting party
documents a problem that needs correction (so as to render a refusal
to find [to make the finding] arbitrary and capricious)."13' He notes
that:
A court might conclude that the agency's decision to ignore a dra-
matic and egregious pollution problem reflects not so much an en-
forcement allocation choice but a decision to get out of the
enforcement business. That is, the courts may choose to police not
125. RODGERS, supra note 116, ch. 3, § 3.38, at 542; Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(b) (1983).
126. RODGERS, supra note 116, ch. 3, § 3.38, at 542.
127. Id. In Seabrook v. Costle, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit strongly criti-
cized the result reached by the district court in Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Power & Light Co., 395 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Wis. 1975):
We think the Wisconsin Environmental court's creation of a nondiscretionary duty
which is not imposed by the statutory language pays too little heed to the doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion. One of the principal bases for the doctrine is judicial recog-
nition that enforcement agencies have only limited resources at their command. The
enforcement agencies are duty-bound to allocate those resources in the interest of the
general public as they perceive it, not in the causes deemed most important by indi-
vidual citizens .... The Wisconsin Environmental court's argument that the duty to
issue a notice upon finding a violation would be an "empty one" if the Administrator
could avoid the duty by failing to make a finding is based ultimately on the assump-
tion that the EPA will not carry out its investigatory duties in good faith. This is an
assumption which, in the absence of clear statutory language or legislative history,
we are unwilling to attribute to Congress.
659 F.2d 1371, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981).
128. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 395 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Wis. 1975); cf. South Carolina
Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 128-35 (D. S.C. 1978) (Clean Water Act).
129. RODGERS, supra note 116, ch. 3, § 3.38, at 542.
130. Id. See Seabrook, 659 F.2d 1371.
131. RODGERS, supra note 116, ch. 3, § 3.38, at 542.
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enforcement pie-slicing but unacceptable shrinkage of the size of
the pie. 1
32
Application of the foregoing discussion to Thomas v. New York
reveals that the issuance of a new finding probably 133 cannot be com-
pelled by the court since it appears to be within the EPA's discretion.
Since the Costle finding failed to meet the court's procedural require-
ment of notice-and-comment, the slate is erased and the whole pro-
cess starts all over again. The court's acceptance of this view,
however, does not make the policy argument on the other side evapo-
rate. The fact remains that long-range transboundary air pollution is
an "egregious problem" and that the current EPA's decision to ignore
a previous Administrator's finding could reflect not so much an "en-
forcement allocation choice" but rather a choice to get out of the "en-
forcement business" altogether.
VI. HIDDEN AGENDA: LAST LOOK AT ALTERNATIVES
The anomalous result reached by the court of appeals which, as
counsel for plaintiffs remarked in the petition for rehearing, compels
EPA to hold notice-and-comment every time they "sneeze[ ] in the
direction of rulemaking"' 134 suggests that there may be an alternative
ground for the holding, namely one based on the separation of powers
doctrine. Two principal factors could dictate this result. First, the
problem of long-range transboundary air pollution is by definition an
international one and one which recent presidents have tried to re-
solve under the umbrella of their foreign affairs powers.' 35 Second,
132. Id. at n.29.
133. Conceivably, since there has been no formal revocation, the plaintiffs have two op-
tions: (1) they could petition the EPA for rulemaking under the Costle findings; or, (2) they
could ask the EPA to remake the finding which triggers section 115 and provide notice-and-
comment with it. Under the first option, the plaintiffs face the prospect of the EPA invoking
Scalia's statement that the Costle findings have no legal effect and therefore rulemaking cannot
attach to them. Under the second option, if the EPA refuses to remake the finding, the plain-
tiffs could proceed under section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act which provides for judicial re-
view of discretionary acts based upon an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. As this
discussion demonstrates, however, if the Administrator retains discretion to issue findings, it is
very difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the failure to find is arbitrary and capricious.
134. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 95, at 14-15 n.7.
135. See generally Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 612, 92
Stat. 990 (1978). Section 612 provides in part:
[T]he United States and Canada have a tradition of cooperative resolution of issues of
mutual concern which is nowhere more evident than in the environmental area.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should make every effort to
negotiate a cooperative agreement with the Government of Canada aimed at preserv-
ing the mutual airshed of the United States and Canada so as to protect and enhance
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international air pollution can also be viewed as a problem more ap-
propriate for the legislature since it is replete with "balancing"
problems: 1) weighing industrial against agricultural and fishing inter-
ests; 2) weighing economic against public health interests; and
3) weighing domestic against international interests.
Cast in this light, the court's opinion reveals new contours. It is
plausible that the introduction of notice-and-comment was a means of
throwing the problem back to what the court viewed as the more ap-
propriate governing body. 136 Therefore, an update of what the other
branches of government have been doing on the acid rain problem is
helpful, not only to demonstrate the strong separation of powers as-
pect inherent in the acid rain problem, but also to show from where
future answers are likely to come.1 37
Throughout the present litigation, the court was aware of the
Joint Report of the Special Envoys on Acid Rain prepared by Drew
air resources and insure the attainment and maintenance of air quality protective of
public health and welfare.
(c) It is further the sense of the Congress that the President, through the Secretary
of State working in concert with interested Federal agencies and the affected States,
should take whatever diplomatic actions appear necessary to reduce or eliminate any
undesirable impact upon the United States and Canada resulting from air pollution
from any source.
Id. (emphasis added).
136. In opposing the petitions by the plaintiffs for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari,
the EPA "reviewed the concerted effort by Administration officials to reach an agreement with
Canadian officials and concluded that requiring states to respond immediately to the problem
[of acid rain] would not comport with the national agenda for addressing acid deposition." 18
ENvTL. REP. 571 (1987) (emphasis added).
137. David Wooley, lead counsel for plaintiffs in New York v. Thomas, commented: "In
the long run it is most likely that the acid rain issue will be settled finally through diplomacy or
legislation. It is a mistake, however, to discount or underestimate the potential benefits of
litigation for acid rain control proponents." Wooley, Acid Rain: Canadian Litigation Options
in U.S. Court and Agency Proceedings, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 139, 139 (1985). The option of
using litigation for the abatement of long range trans-boundary air pollution has not however
been wholly abandoned.
Five other cases pending in federal court seek to compel the EPA to address the acid rain
problem under other provisions of the Clean Air Act. See Natural Resources Defense Counsel
v. Thomas, No. 85-1488 (D.C. Cir. argued Sept. 25, 1987) (based on the tall stack provisions of
the Clean Air Act § 123); New York v. EPA, Nos. 84-1592 and 85-1082 (D.C. Cir. to be re-
argued Dec. 10, 1987) (based on the interstate pollution provisions of the Clean Air Act
§ 126); Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Thomas, No. 87-1437 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 28,
1987) (seeking to overturn EPA's refusal to establish a secondary particulate matter standard
for acid rain, § 109 and § 602(h) of the Clean Air Act); (4) Maine v. Thomas, civil action, No.
87-0204P (D. Ma.) (seeking to force EPA to address acid rain through visibility impairment
provisions of the Clean Air Act § 169a); Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, No. 85-
Civ.9507(DNE) (S.D.N.Y.) (seeking to force EPA to revise NAAQs for sulfur dioxide in a
matter which would prevent acid rain, § 109 and § 602(h)). The state of New York is a party
to each of the above cases.
Clean Air Act
Lewis and William Davis pursuant to the agreement reached at the
so-called "Shamrock Summit".' 38 The Lewis-Davis Report set forth
a number of recommendations including: (1) the implementation of a
5-year, $5 billion control technology commercial demonstration pro-
gram, half of which would be funded by the federal government for
projects which industry recommends and for which industry would
contribute the other half; (2) a panel, headed by a senior U.S. cabinet
official, to oversee the research demonstration program and to select
the projects to be funded with a representative from Canada invited to
sit on the panel; (3) a review of the American and Canadian existing
air pollution program and legislation for the purpose of identifying
opportunities for addressing environmental concerns; and, (4) the de-
velopment of standard, accurate methods to measure dry deposi-
tion.' 39 In addition to these items, the Report also recommended
greater exchange of relevant data both at the agency and private levels
and more scientific research across the board.'14
While adopting a favorable posture toward the recommendations
of the Lewis-Davis Report,14' the Reagan Administration moved
slowly. Then, just two weeks before the scheduled summit conference
with Prime Minister Mulroney in Ottawa, Reagan announced that
"the United States would seek $2.5 billion over five years for projects
to combat acid rain.' 42 Reagan stated that the $2.5 billion would be
used for test projects and that he would encourage private industry to
at least match that amount. He also proposed a special advisory
panel which would include some Canadian members to take charge of
"funding and selecting pollution control projects."' 43 When the re-
quest reached the House of Representatives on June 26, 1987, only
$350 million was approved for intensified research to control acid
138. Lewis-Davis Report, supra note 26, at 29-33. (Lewis and Davis characterized their
recommendations as "realistic": "They must not ask either country to make a sudden, revolu-
tionary change in its position.") Id. at 29. Compare, Constructive Step on Acid Rain, Wash.
Post, Jan. 9, 1986, at A22, col. 1, ("The U.S. side of the report does still tiptoe as to the extent
of the damage done. But it does not pretend there is none.").
139. Lewis-Davis Report, supra note 26, at 29-35.
140. Id.
141. White House Press Release, Statement by the President, Jan. 8, 1986 ("This report
represents an earnest effort by the United States and Canada to address an important environ-
mental issue and exemplifies what can be accomplished in the spirit of Canadian-American
cooperation. We will be carefully reviewing the report and its recommendations.") (on file at
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal). Id.
142. Reagan Backs Canada on Acid Rain, Asks $2.5 Billion, L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1987,
§ I, at 12, col. 1.
143. Id.
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When Reagan met with Mulroney in Ottawa, the Canadians
asked the United States to sign a treaty which would reduce the air
pollution that causes acid rain by 50% by 1994.145 This would be a
more formal accord than the bilateral agreement the Canadians asked
for earlier which the United States resisted.146 It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the Canadians will be able to pursue the treaty since one of
Mulroney's major priorities is a free-trade agreement with the United
States which might tend to overshadow the acid rain issue. 147
On the legislative front, four new bills148 have been offered in the
Senate and referred to committee for the abatement of air pollution
and its domestic and international effects. Especially noteworthy in
the international area is the proposed New Clean Air Act 49 intro-
duced by Senator Stafford. That bill proposes an amendment to sec-
tion 115 of the Clean Air Act which provides that if air pollution
emissions in the United States cause or contribute to a violation of a
water quality standard or requirement established by a foreign country,
it is deemed to cause or contribute to air pollution which may reason-
ably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign
country. 150
Nothing could more clearly demonstrate than does this bill the
dissatisfaction with the EPA having discretion to render the initial
section 115 finding. By its exact wording, it revokes EPA discretion
on the very point so troubling in the Thomas v. New York opinion, i.e.
that re-issuance of new findings by the EPA subject to notice-and-
comment is within the discretion of that agency.'
15
By conditioning the decision of issuance of an initial section 115
finding on the basis of an objective criterion, like a country's water
144. Reagan Rebuffed on Acid Rain Funds, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, § I, at 14, col. 6.
It has been suggested that pro-abatement congressmen voted down the request since they saw
it as not directly addressing the issue. Also, since utilities were to manage the funds to develop
new technology, it was believed they would not aggressively discharge their duty. Id.
145. Mulroney Asks Reagan for Treaty on Acid Rain, L.A. Times, Apr. 6, 1987, § I, at 1,
col. 3.
146. Id.
147. Id. Canadian polls, however, seem to indicate that a resolution of the acid rain prob-
lem is considered top priority among the Canadian public. The Inside EPA Weekly Report,
Mar. 20, 1987, vol. 8, no. 12.
148. S. 95, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 300, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 321,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 316, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
149. S. 300, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (entitled "New Clean Air Act").
150. Id. at 11.
151. See supra notes 111-132 and accompanying text.
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quality standards, the enforcement of section 115 would rest to a
smaller degree on the whim of the Administrator. Concomitantly, it
would allow courts to take a more active role in the enforcement of
section 115 because judges could now explore the entire terrain of the
EPA decision without having to skirt the murky swamp of adminis-
trative discretion.
The bill also requires the President, by January 1, 1988, to "insti-
tute negotiations with Canada and Mexico for the purpose of conclud-
ing a tripartite agreement" to, inter alia, minimize projected and
existing levels of air pollution and create an institutional framework
to control sources of transboundary pollution.' 52 Additionally, the
bill directs the Secretary of Treasury, after consultation with the
EPA, to submit a study on a "system of tariffs on emissions adequate
to encourage reductions in emissions of precursors of acid deposition
and other forms of environmental pollution."' 53
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether the legislative proposals or the executive negotiations
dealing with the problem of acid rain ever bear fruit remains to be
seen. One thing, however, is certain: Thomas v. New York represents
a major obstacle to any future attempts towards the enforcement of
section 115 of the Clean Air Act as presently constituted. At best,
future plaintiffs will have to hope for an EPA Administrator willing
to re-issue the findings that trigger section 115 and then hold notice-
and-comment at the precise time the court requires; at worst, how-
ever, future plaintiffs have witnessed a de facto severance of section
115 from the Clean Air Act on separation of powers grounds. In
either event, the boulder has tumbled down, and the difficult struggle
must begin anew.
Dean Adam Willis
152. S. 300, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
153. Id. at 12.
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